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BIFURCATION:
A POWERFUL BUT UNDERUTILIZED TOOL IN SOUTH CAROLINA
CIVIL LITIGATION
1. INTRODUCTION
Bifurcation, the division of trial issues for separate and independent
evaluation,' might be one of the most important concepts in civil litigation. It can
have a major impact on everything from the framing of litigation strategy2 to the
likelihood of success at trial.' While there are many ways to bifurcate,4 or even
trifurcate, a trial, this Comment focuses on only the historically predominant
method of bifurcation: separation of the issue of liability from the issue of
damages.6
Though its definition is relatively straightforward, bifurcation might also be
one of the more misunderstood concepts in civil litigation. Judges from state and
federal courts laud the virtues of bifurcation, yet these same judges rarely bifurcate
cases before them.7 The "conventional wisdom"'8 among trial lawyers is that
bifurcation tends to be a boon for the defendant;9 however, several studies have
shown a benefit for the plaintiff. °
1. See Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance: Jury Instruction on Damage
Awards, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 743, 756 (2000); Laurens Walker, A Model Plan to Resolve
Federal Class Action Cases by Jury Trial, 88 VA. L. REV. 405, 412 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Rosen v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 1675 (LMM), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16511, at *2, * 16-17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1994) (granting plaintiff s motion for bifurcation even where
defendant argued that bifurcation would have a significant impact on trial strategy); William T.
Hudgins, The Fragile Right to a Civil Jury Trial in Colorado, COLO. LAW., Jan. 1998, at 49, 50 ("[A]
bifurcated trial can have a dramatic impact on trial strategy.").
3. See discussion infra Part II.C.
4. See Hydrite Chem. Co. v. Calumet Lubricants Co., 47 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The
judge can bifurcate . . . a case at whatever point will . . . promote economy and accuracy in
adjudication.").
5. Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of Procedural Issues
in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 271 (1990) (explaining that trifurcation is a
litigation tool that separates trials into three issues: general causation, liability, and damages).
6. See Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705, 705 (2000) (citing 9
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2390 (3d ed.
1995)); 8 JAMES WM. MOORE ETAL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 42.20(6)(b) (3d ed. 1999). Another
popular bifurcation method is to separate compensatory claims from punitive claims. See Michael L.
Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages'Iron Cage, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1322 (2005). While
this Comment does not specifically address bifurcation of punitive damages in South Carolina, any
changes to the baseline rules ofbifurcation would inherently have a significant impact on the bifurcation
of punitive claims. Still, it is better to treat the two main types of bifurcation separately. See discussion
infra Part IID.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 21-32.
8. Drury Stevenson, Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213, 228 (2006).
9. Id. at 228 29.
10. See discussion infra Part II.C.
1
Shoemake: Bifurcation: A Powerful but Underutilized Tool in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2008
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
South Carolina courts are not immune from this misconception. State courts
have praised the practice" and declared thatjudges have broad discretion regarding
bifurcation. 2 However, state court judges have rarely used bifurcation, 3 and the
state has developed restrictions that seem to limit the application of bifurcation in
most cases. 4 Specifically, South Carolina courts allow bifurcation only ifthe issues
of both liability and damages do not overlap, 15 and the issues "are so distinct that
[a separate] trial of each alone would not result in injustice."' 6 South Carolina
courts have broadly interpreted this "no overlap" requirement to preclude
bifurcation when some evidence exists that is common to the issues of both liability
and damages.' This rule is significantly different from the rules of other state and
federal courts that have concluded-while working under nearly identical Rules of
Civil Procedure-that the existence of some evidence that addresses both liability
and damages does not automatically preclude an otherwise justified bifurcation. 8
This Comment argues that given the potential efficiency of bifurcation, the
overwhelmingjudicial support for the practice, and the effectiveness of bifurcation
for both plaintiffs and defendants, the South Carolina Supreme Court should adopt
a less stringent approach that would allow trialj udges to bifurcate more cases. Such
an approach would be more consistent with the current South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, especially considering that other courts have offered a broader
interpretation based on nearly identical rules.19
Part 11 of this Comment analyzes four theoretical bases for bifurcation:
opinions on the efficiency and use of bifurcation; arguments for and against the
practice; the impact of bifurcation on plaintiffs and defendants; and bifurcation's
relationship to tort reform and punitive damages. Part II1 provides a brief history
of bifurcation from the nineteenth century English courts through the current
Federal and South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Part IV specifically examines
the relevant caselaw on bifurcation in South Carolina and compares those decisions
to other similar federal and state cases. Part V concludes by explaining that while
South Carolina courts acknowledge the benefits of bifurcation, the "no overlap"
requirement represents an outdated historical aversion to the practice that prevents
trial judges from effectively using bifurcation as a tool for judicial economy and
fairness. Therefore, this Comment concludes, the South Carolina Supreme Court
should abandon this requirement.
11. See, e.g., Durham v. Vinson, 360 S.C. 639, 645 n.2, 602 S.E.2d 760, 762 n.2 (2004) ("We
encourage judges ... to bifurcate trials ... when bifurcation helps to clarify and simplify the issues.").
12. See, e.g., Senter v. Piggly Wiggly Carolina Co., 341 S.C. 74, 77, 533 S.E.2d 575, 577 (2000)
(noting that bifurcation is a matter left to the "sound discretion of the trial court").
13. See discussion infra Part III.B.
14. See discussion infra Part IVA.
15. Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines, 341 S.C. 68, 73 n.8, 533 S.E.2d 331, 333 n.8 (2000).
16. Creighton v. Coligny Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 334 S.C. 96, 108, 512 S.E.2d 510, 516 (Ct. App.
1998) (citing Fortune v. Gibson, 304 S.C. 279, 281, 403 S.E.2d 674, 675 (Ct. App. 1991)).
17. See id.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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11. THEORETICAL BASES FOR BIFURCATION
The Federal and South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure give courts broad
discretionary power to bifurcate trials to further convenience, avoid prejudice in,
or expedite and economize litigation.2 ° Understanding both how jurists and
litigators view the practice, and how bifurcation influences litigation can help
illustrate how bifurcation furthers the ends listed above.
A. More Popular Than Practiced
Many jurists and scholars extol the virtues of bifurcation and its ability to
streamline the judicial process, yet courts infrequently employ the practice.2 One
comprehensive study of federal and state judges from across the country, including
South Carolina,22 found that of the ninety-four percent of federal judges who have
granted bifurcation in their career, eighty-four percent felt it improved the trial
process.23 Still, only nineteen percent of all federal judges bifurcated more than ten
cases in the previous three years, while fifty-two percent bifurcated less than five
times in the same period.24
At the state level, of the eighty-two percent of judges who have granted
bifurcation,25 eighty-four percent felt it improved the trial process26 and seventy-
seven percent felt it enhanced the fairness of the outcome.27 However, only twenty-
one percent bifurcated more than ten cases in the previous three years, while fifty-
seven percent granted bifurcation less than five times.28 Bifurcation, then, is a
matter left to the discretion ofj udges who strongly endorse the practice but actually
bifurcate very few cases.
The explanation for this paradox is not completely clear. Procedural rules and
caselaw in virtually every jurisdiction allow bifurcation.29 Besides separating
punitive damages claims, the vast majority of states, including South Carolina, have
no statutes that address bifurcation in any other manner.3" While South Carolina's
statutes are silent on bifurcation, caselaw affords trial judges broad discretion in
bifurcating cases.3 However, South Carolina appellate judges rarely approve of the
practice at the trial level. 2
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b); S.C. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
21. See Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State
andFederal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV.
731, 733-34 (1989) [hereinafter Survey] ("Judges overwhelmingly support the principle and practice
of bifurcation.... However, bifurcation is used only occasionally.").
22. Id. at 731 ("State judges were interviewed in every state except Delaware, Hawaii, and
Alaska.").
23. Id. at 743.
24. Id. at 744 tbl.5.4.
25. Id. tbl.5.2.
26. Id. tbl.5.3.
27. Id. at 745 tbl.5.6.
28. Id. at 744 tbl.5.4.
29. See id. at 743 tbl.5.1.
30. See JAMES M. BECK & ANTHONY VALE, DRUG AND MEDICAL DEVICE PRODUCT LIABILITY
DESKBOOK § 11.02[l][a] (4th release 2007).
31. Durham v. Vinson, 360 S.C. 639, 644-45 n.2, 602 S.E.2d 760, 762 n.2 (2004).
32. See discussion infra Part IVA.
2008]
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The inconsistency might result from judges viewing bifurcation as a powerful
tool best reserved for less common circumstances, such as extremely complex
litigation involving mass torts or patent actions.33 Professor Gensler notes that
"when judges say they like bifurcation, what they really mean is that they like
bifurcation within [these] traditional parameters." 4 Professor Gensler, who has
argued for more routine bifurcation,35 suggests that encouraging the use of the
procedure outside these traditional parameters requires a modern examination ofthe
bifurcation debate. 6
B. The Bifurcation Debate
The chief argument for bifurcation is promotion of judicial economy.
7
Bifurcation reduces trial time regardless of which party prevails on the issue of
liability. Clearly, if the defendant prevails on liability, a second trial on damages
becomes moot.3 8 When the plaintiff prevails on liability, however, the case is likely
to settle and would therefore never reach the damages phase.3 9 As Judge David
Tobin notes, "I have bifurcated hundreds of cases in which the issues of liability
and damages were involved. The most surprising statistic is that during [these] three
and one-half years I have tried only one case in which the issue was damages!,
4
1
Judge Tobin also notes a number of other advantages of bifurcation that promote
expediency, including shorter discovery periods and earlier trial dates.4'
Internally, bifurcated trials seem to operate more efficiently. Such trials reduce
the number of witnesses and exhibits jurors have to process and requires lawyers
to focus narrowly on issues that are more specific.42 As a result, some studies have
found that jurors better understand evidence and use it more appropriately in
bifurcated trials.
43
Bifurcation can also reduce prejudice to the defendant. Studies show that
evidence related to the severity of an injury, which is normally excluded in a
liability trial, can evoke feelings of sympathy among j urors and influence a j ury's
determination of liability.44 Specifically, a jury might award damages to a plaintiff
whose case lacks legal merit "when they feel sorry for the plaintiff and believe that
33. See Gensler, supra note 6, at 722.
34. Id. at 723.
35. See id. at 783.
36. See id. at 709 11.
37. Steven S. Gensler, Prejudice, Confusion, and the Bifurcated Civil Jury Trial: Lessons from
Tennessee, 67 TENN. L. REV. 653, 653 (2000).
38. See David L. Tobin, To B... or Not to B... "B. .."Means Bifurcation, FLA. B.J., Nov.
2000, at 14, 16.
39. See id. But see infra note 57 and accompanying text.
40. Id. at 14. Judge Tobin is a federal judge in the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 20.
41. Id. at 20.
42. Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 157 (1996)
(noting that bifurcated trials enable "the jury to focus on one issue at a time," making the "evidence
more orderly and understandable to the jurors").
43. See, e.g., Christine M. Shea Adams & Martin J. Bourgeois, Separating Compensatory and
Punitive Damage AwardDecisions by TrialBifurcation, 30 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 11, 23 (2006) (noting
that evidence was "more likely to be used correctly within juries hearing the bifurcated evidence");
Strier, supra note 42, at 157.
44. See BECK & VALE, supra note 30, § 11.02[1 ][c][ii] (citing Gensler, supra note 6, at 741-42).
[Vol. 59: 433
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the defendant is better able to bear the cost."4 One study found that jurors were
more sympathetic to a severely injured plaintiff, and that because of this sympathy,
the jurors were "substantially more likely to find ... liability."4 6 Furthermore, the
sympathy toward the plaintiff actually resulted in animosity toward the defendant.4 7
A bifurcated trial would remove from the liability phase the sympathetic, emotional
evidence related to damages,48 increasing the likelihood that the jury would make
legally appropriate use of evidence49 to reach "a rational, as opposed to emotional,"
verdict.5"
Avoiding prejudice is beneficial not only for the defendant. The plaintiff may
desire bifurcation where the evidence or testimony related to damages is likely to
elicit "antipathy for the plaintiff, rather than sympathy."'" Additionally, in some
unitary trials, a plaintiff s injuries might result in damages requests so high that the
jurors are inclined to give a defendant the benefit of the doubt by finding in a
defendants's favor.52
Critics of bifurcation argue that the practice has a detrimental effect on the
judicial system. Dan Cytryn, a plaintiff s attorney from Florida, specifically attacks
Judge Tobin's assertion that a bifurcated trial enhances judicial economy.53 He
argues that bifurcation would actually lead to longer trials and discourage
settlement.54 Cytryn reasons that the defendant would avoid any pretrial settlement
and only consider a settlement after the court rendered a liability verdict.55 Further,
he argues that judges would delay the start of a damages trial in hopes that the
parties reach a settlement. 56 However, the authors of one study have challenged the
notion that bifurcation has a significant impact on settlement ratios.
57
Opponents of bifurcation also argue that it tends to create a sterile
environment.58 Stated differently, a bifurcated trial hides the seriousness of the
plaintiffs injuries from the jury and removes the human element from the
45. Gensler, supra note 6, at 716 (citing Lewis Mayers, The Severance for Trial ofLiability from
Damage, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 389, 394 (1938)).
46. Gensler, supra note 37, at 667 (citing Brian H. Bornstein, From Compassion to
Compensation: The Effect ofInjury Severity on Mock Jurors' Liability Judgments, 28 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1477, 1485 (1998)).
47. Bornstein, supra note 46, at 1485 ("Increasing the amount of positive sentiment felt for one
party was accompanied by increased negative feelings for that party's antagonist.").
48. Strier, supra note 42, at 158 (citing Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 5, at 271).
49. See Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 5, at 282.
50. See Mayers, supra note 45, at 400-01.
51. Gensler, supra note 37, at 668; see also Taylor v. Racetrac Petrol., Inc., 519 S.E.2d 282,
284 85 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that the trial court should have bifurcated liability and damages
where evidence of drug and alcohol abuse prejudiced the plaintiff).
52. See Gensler, supra note 37, at 668: Edith Greene et al., The Effects ofInjury Severity on Jury
Negligence Decisions, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 675, 690 (1999).
53. Dan Cytryn, Bifurcation in Personal njury Cases: ShouldJudges Be Allowed to Use the "B"
Word?, 26 NOVA L. REV. 249, 250 (2001).
54. Id. at 261-63.
55. Id. at 262.
56. Id.
57. Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1623 & tbl.9 (1963) (reporting virtually identical percentages of cases settled
before and after Illinois adopted a rule permitting bifurcated trials).
58. Cytryn, supra note 53, at 255 (citing Gensler, supra note 6, at 767 69).
2008]
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proceedings. 9 Professor Jack Weinstein notes that juries are responsible for far
more than the mechanical application of law, arguing that juries satisfy a person's
"strongly felt need for a 'fair decision,' for the judgment of reasonable and unbiased
peers instead of the logical, legally proper, result."6
Judge Tobin acknowledges that the sterile environment is one of the major
disadvantages to bifurcation because it potentially limits the plaintiffs ability to
present a sympathetic view.6 To overcome this disadvantage, he suggests that
courts instruct the jury that the plaintiff has injuries, and, where the circumstances
so warrant, that those injuries are severe.62 Still, Judge Tobin believes that the
advantages of bifurcation are strong enough to warrant its broader use.6 3 Judge
Tobin appears to distinguish between the human element as a factor-which courts
should allow and the human element as the controlling force which courts
should work to prevent. The predominance of the latter prompted an Illinois district
court to declare that removing sympathy in the liability phase of a bifurcated trial
is "fundamental in the true administration of justice."64
Opponents of bifurcation have also raised constitutional concerns about the
procedure. Under the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, "no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law. 6 5 While some courts have
interpreted this clause to mean that different finders-of-fact cannot decide the same
legal issue, other courts have found that this clause poses little obstacle to
bifurcation.66 Even under the narrowest reading in the context of bifurcation, the
Reexamination Clause would apply only when the bifurcated trial employed
separate juries.67 Given that the same jury generally hears both portions of a
bifurcated trial, this constitutional issue would only arise in a minority of cases.68
Regarding that minority of cases, Gensler notes that "[t]he Re-examination Clause
does not prohibit different juries from hearing the same evidence; it only prohibits
different juries from deciding the same issue."6 9 Thus, this potential constitutional
barrier does little to caution against more routine use of bifurcation. Courts seem
willing to bifurcate complex and time-consuming cases, 70 which, given the typical
length of litigation and geographic dispersion, are more likely to have different
juries than a traditional negligence or slip-and-fall action.7 Any expansion of
59. Id.
60. Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the
Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REv. 831, 833 (1961).
61. Tobin, supra note 38, at 16.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 20.
64. O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577, 585 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
66. W. Russell Taber, The Reexamination Clause: Exploring Bifurcation in Mass Tort Litigation,
73 DEF. COUNS. J. 63, 64 (2006) (citations omitted).
67. Gensler, supra note 6, at 735; see also In re Rhone-Poulene Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303
(7th Cir. 1995) (noting that ajudge should not divide the issues so that they are examined by different
juries).
68. Gensler, supra note 6, at 735 36.
69. Id. at 736.
70. See Durham v. Vinson, 360 S.C. 639, 644-45 n.2, 602 S.E.2d 760, 762 n.2 (2004); Gensler,
supra note 6, at 722.
71. See Gensler, supra note 6, at 735 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 59: 433
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bifurcation seems especially likely to affect those latter cases that would not require
two differentjuries, making any potential constitutional issue no more problematic
than it is currently.
C. Studies on the Benefits of Bifurcation
Those involved in litigation might assume that bifurcation aids the defendant
by compartmentalizing the trial and removing some of the "emotional" evidence
from the liability phase.2 One landmark study found that the defendant prevailed
fifty-six percent of the time in a bifurcated trial, but prevailed only thirty-four
percent of the time in a unitary trial.73 Conversely, the plaintiffs chances of
prevailing increased from forty-four percent in a bifurcated trial to sixty-six percent
in a unitary trial." Although these are significant differences, they should be
considered in context. The study was conducted in 1963 and examined unitary and
bifurcated trials only in tort cases in northern Illinois federal courts.75 Another
study, conducted in 1990, used mock juries in two toxic tort trials one trial was
bifurcated and the other was unitary-to determine the effect of bifurcation on the
outcome of the trial.6 The juries deciding the unitary trials found for the plaintiff
nearly every time, while the juries deciding the bifurcation trials found for the
plaintiff only two-thirds of the time.77 Moreover, the researchers found that when
deciding liability in the unitary trial, the jurors evaluated other evidence, especially
the evidence regarding damages. 78
While bifurcated trials can aid the defendant, they can offer a strategic
advantage to the plaintiff as well. Studies have shown that while the defendant
might win a favorable liability verdict more often in bifurcated trials, bifurcated
trials result in "much larger" damages awards for the plaintiff when the plaintiff
also prevails on liability.7 9
The relevance ofthese studies is not clear. The studies that only simulated trials
seem to have lacked the nuances of an actual trial artfulness of opposing counsel
and disparate resources between plaintiffs and defendants.80 Furthermore, the
studies that used actual trials tended to focus only on tort claims in specific
jurisdictions."
Still, bifurcation does not result in a complete advantage for one party over
another. While the plaintiff may lose the liability phase more often, the defendant
risks paying a substantially larger damages award when the plaintiff prevails.
Further, the results of the 1990 study indicate that when the plaintiffs lose, they do
72. See id. at 767 68; Stevenson, supra note 8, at 228 29.
73. Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 57, at 1612 tbl.3.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1606 07. The authors designed the study to focus specifically on a rule adopted by the
Northern District of Illinois that permitted bifurcation of liability and damages issues in civil cases. Id.
76. Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 5, at 271-72.
77. Id. at 278 tbl.3.
78. Id. at 282.
79. Id. at 284. Other studies have reached similar results. Gensler, supra note 6, at 741 45
(reporting the results of several studies examining the effects of bifurcating trials).
80. Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 5, at 274-75.
81. Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 57, at 1606.
2008]
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so because they lack the evidence to prove liability, 2 which is consistent with the
"true administration of justice."8"
D. Bifurcation, Tort Reform, and Punitive Damages
The recent push for tort reform in the United States has resulted in specific
focus on bifurcation. 4 Given the growing attitude that courts should avoid
"unreasoned and capricious jury verdicts" '8 5 and the ability of bifurcation to help
manage caseloads86 and properly focus juries, 7 bifurcation could be part of the
solution to these problems. For example, a California commission on tort reform
has recommended the mandatory bifurcation of liability and damages. 8 However,
advocates of tort reform often use the term bifurcation to mean the separation of
punitive damages claims from compensatory claims.8 9 While the rationale
supporting punitive bifurcation often mirrors the rationale in favor of liability and
damages bifurcation, 9 grouping the two types of bifurcation together seems to
inappropriately politicize the issue and marginalize the impact of liability and
damages bifurcation.
State legislatures, as opposed to courts, have been the guiding force for
punitive bifurcation. 9' A large number of states require courts to bifurcate either the
82. See supra notes 76 78 and accompanying text.
83. O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577, 585 (N.D. 111. 1960).
84. See, e.g., PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND BUSINESS TORTS: A PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK 84
(Thomas J. Collin ed., 1998) [hereinafter BUSINESS TORTS] (noting that state legislatures have enacted
various punitive damages bifurcation measures "as part of comprehensive tort reform statutes"); Rustad,
supra note 6, at 1299 (explaining the key role punitive damages play in modern tort reform debates).
85. Kristy Lee Bertelsen, Note, From Speciali ed Courts to Specialifed Juries: Calling For
Professional Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 1, 32 (1998); see
also BUSINESS TORTS, supra note 84, at 83 84 (noting the trend toward bifurcation when punitive
damages are involved).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
87. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
88. REPORT OF THE CAL. CITIZENS' COMM'N ON TORT REFORM, RIGHTING THE LIABILITY
BALANCE 147-48 (1977). Texas also requires the bifurcation of liability and damages upon motion by
the defendant. TEX CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.009(a)-(c) (Vernon 1997).
89. See Rustad, supra note 6, at 1321 24.
90. See BECK & VALE, supra note 30, § 11.02[l][e]; Rustad, supra note 6, at 1323 24 (arguing
that separation of punitive and compensatory claims removes emotional evidence and prevents jury
bias).
91. See BUSINESS TORTS, supra note 84, at 84.
[Vol. 59: 433
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amount of punitive damages9 2 or the entire punitive claim,93 and the vast majority
of states do so by statute.94
Legislatures have designed these bifurcation statutes to control the amount of
punitive damages awarded. 95 The political discussion, therefore, has focused on the
narrow issue of damages amounts 96 rather than the inherent merits of bifurcation.
Such a narrow discussion does not reflect the impact bifurcation could have on
other aspects of litigation. 97 If the goal of tort reform is to improve the civil justice
system as a whole, then attention to the inherent merits of bifurcation is beneficial
in avoiding the political fray and the limited debate surrounding punitive
bifurcation.98
92. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-23(b) (LexisNexis 2005) (upon motion of either party); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.17.020(a) (2006) (required automatically); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d) (West 1997) (upon motion
ofthe defendant); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5. 1(d)(1) (2000) (required automatically); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 668A. 1 (2) (West 1998) (requiring the jury to first answer an interrogatory regarding punitive liability
and then, if necessary, answer an interrogatory regarding the amount); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(a)
(2005) (required automatically); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.186(1)-(2) (LexisNexis 2005) (required
automatically); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(1) (2) (West Supp. 2007) (upon motion of either party);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(a) (2007) (required automatically); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42.005(3) (LexisNexis 2006) (required automatically); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(C) (West
Supp. 2007) (required automatically); TEX CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.009 (Vernon 1997)
(upon motion of the defendant); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2) (Supp. 2007) (permitting evidence of
a party's wealth to be admitted only after the jury makes a finding of liability for punitive damages);
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 506 (Fla. 1994) (required automatically); Rupert v.
Sellers, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904, 912 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (required automatically); Hodges v. S.C. Toof
& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992) (upon motion of the defendant); Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d
1121, 1132 (Wyo. 1981) (required automatically).
93. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-211 (a) (2005) (upon motion of either party); 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.05(c) (West 2003) (upon motion ofthe defendant); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(4)
(2000 & West Supp. 2007) (upon motion of either party); MIss. CODEANN. § 11-1-65(1)(b) (c) (2002
& Supp. 2007) (required automatically); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.13(a) (d) (West 2000) (required
automatically); N.C. GEN. STAT. § ID-30 (2007) (upon motion of the defendant); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-03.2-11(2) (Supp. 2007) (upon motion of either party); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.21(B)(I)(a) (b), (D)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (upon motion of either party).
94. See sources cited supra notes 92-93. The South Carolina General Assembly attempted to pass
such a statute in 1997, but the measure failed. H.R. 3019, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1997),
available at http://scstatehouse.net/sess112 1997-1998/bills/3019.htm. The legislation would have
mandated that "[i]n all actions seeking an award of punitive damages, the trier of fact shall determine
the amount of punitive damages separately from the amount of compensation for all other damages."
Id.
95. See, e.g., GA. CODEANN. § 51-12-5.1(d)(2) (2000) (requiring that when a fact finder decides
that punitive damages are appropriate, a second trial shall determine "what amount of damages will be
sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the defendant").
96. See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 6, at 1324 ("The purpose of bifurcation is to prevent evidence
of aggravating circumstances or wealth of the defendant from creating jury bias in the compensatory
damages stage.").
97. See discussion supra Part 11.B-C.
98. See Rustad, supra note 6, at 1301 (arguing that many tort reform measures regarding punitive
damages do not "advance the performance of our civil justice system").
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111. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF BIFURCATION
While the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure permit separate trials in
several circumstances, 99 South Carolina courts granting bifurcation generally cite
to Rule 42(b)'00 :
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and
economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of
any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party
claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by
jury as declared by the Constitution or as given by a statute of the
State.'0 '
Although Congress revised the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in December
2007, South Carolina's bifurcation rule remains substantively similar to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b).'0 2 As a result, South Carolina courts use federal
caselaw when examining and analyzing the state rule. 103 Therefore, understanding
the history of bifurcation in South Carolina requires understanding the history of
Federal Rule 42(b). Because of the recent revision, the text of South Carolina's
Rule 42(b) is no longer identical to the federal rule. The former federal rule read as
follows:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and
economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of
any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party
claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by
99. See, e.g., S.C. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (allowing any party to move for the separate trial of a third-
party claim); S.C. R. Civ. P. 18(c) (permitting the court to bifurcate a trial "as will prevent a party from
being embarrassed, delayed or ... to prevent delay or prejudice" where multiple claims have been
joined); S.C. R. Civ. P. 20(b) (permitting separate trials to prevent embarrassment, delay, or prejudice
where other parties have been joined).
100. See Senter v. Piggly Wiggly Carolina Co., 341 S.C. 74, 77, 533 S.E.2d 575, 577 (2000);
Creighton v. Coligny Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 334 S.C. 96, 108 09, 512 S.E.2d 510,516 17 (Ct. App. 1998).
101. S.C. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
102. The current federal rule reads as follows: "For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite
and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims,
counterclaims, or third-party claims. When ordering a separate trial, the court must preserve any federal
right to ajury trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). However, the changes were "intended to be stylistic only,"
so the textual changes should not affect any analytical comparison of the South Carolina rule and the
federal rule. FED. R. CIv. P. 42(b) advisory committee's note to 2007 amendment; see also Lee H.
Rosenthal, Preface to MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE: REVISION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, at vii xiv (2007) (detailing the history of the rules and the reasons for the stylistic
changes).
103. See, e.g., Johnson v. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 292 S.C. 51, 54-55, 354 S.E.2d 895, 896-97 (1987)
(reviewing federal caselaw in construing South Carolina Rule 42).
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jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
or as given by a statute of the United States. °4
A. The History of Bifurcation at the Federal Level
In Simon v. Philip Morris Inc.,' °5 a district court in New York outlined the
history of bifurcation.0 6 Courts began to separate the issues of liability and
damages at trial as early as the seventeenth century. 10 7 For example, early English
courts afforded trial judges wide latitude in bifurcating issues for trial:
[T]he court or judge may, in any case or matter, at any time or
from time to time, order that ... one or more questions of fact be
tried before the others ... and in all cases may order that one or
more issues of fact be tried before any other or others.'0 8
In early American jurisprudence, both courts of law 19 and courts of equity"0°
used bifurcation. When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged courts of law
and equity in 1938, Rule 42(b) allowed for bifurcation in both courts."' Other than
the stylistic revision in 2007, the United States Supreme Court has amended Rule
42(b) only once, in 1966.112 The amendment "authoriz[ed] a separate trial 'when
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy,' and ... add[ed] the
provision that begins with the words 'always preserving.""' 3 The advisory
committee notes from the 1966 amendment recognized the efficiency of bifurcation
in admiralty suits.' The committee further encouraged bifurcation "where
experience has demonstrated its worth"' '" but also stated that "separation of issues
was not to be routinely ordered."' 16 Given this cautionary note, one scholar believes
that the 1966 committee notes "galvanized a presumption against bifurcation."
'"17
However, the court in Simon noted:
This statement did not limit in any way the trial judge's historic
discretion to sever issues for trial in individual cases. The drafters
recognized that the severance of issues for trial was a useful
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (1966) (amended 2007).
105. 200 F.R.D. 21 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
106. Id. at 25 27.
107. Id. at 26-27 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 164, * 164).
108. Id. at 25 (alteration in original) (quoting Rules of the English Supreme Court of Judicature
(1883) order 36, rule 8).
109. Id. at 26 (citing Gasoline Prod. Co., Inc. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497 98
(1931) (noting that a separate jury in a court of law could decide damages)).
110. Id. at 26 (citing Finley v. Asphalt Paving Co., 69 F.2d 498, 498 (8th Cir. 1934) (noting the
bifurcation of the trial of a patent suit); Allen v. Phila. Co., 265 F. 817, 817 18 (3d Cir. 1920) (noting
the bifurcation of a trial at equity)).
111. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 1004 (3d ed. 2002).
112. 9id §2381 (2d ed. 1994).
113. Id. at 426 n. 1 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (1966) (amended 2007)).
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Gensler, supra note 6, at 710.
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procedure whenever difficulty in proving one issue may warrant
its being postponed as well as in complex litigations...
B. The History of Bifurcation in South Carolina
Before the 1985 revisions of the procedural rules,"9 South Carolina courts
rarely bifurcated trials in any manner. 2 ' However, courts did allow bifurcation of
legal and equitable claims, leaving the decision to the discretion of the trial
courts.' 2 ' Even though bifurcation of liability and damages was permitted, there was
very little caselaw on the issue. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Aetna
Insurance Co.'22 (SCE&G) helps explain this lack of decisions. In this case, the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that it was inappropriate for an appeals court
to order a new trial only on the issue of damages,"' stating that "[iln the absence
of [an] authorizing statute or rule we do not feel warranted in making such an
important innovation in our procedure.'
24
SCE&G remained good law for nearly a quarter of a century. However, in
1981, the South Carolina Supreme Court overruled the case when it decided
Industrial Welding Supplies, Inc. v. Atlas Vending Co. 125 The court noted that other
than SCE&G there was no other authority to support such a broad rule prohibiting
the separation of trial issues. 26 Instead, the court adopted a new rule:
[W]here there are distinct jury issues, and the issue as to which a
new trial is required is separate from all other issues, and the error
requiring new trial does not affect the determination of any other
issue, the scope of [the] new trial may be limited to the single
issue."'
Importantly, this holding, decided before the court adopted the current South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 seems to apply only to new trials of separate
issues ordered by appellate courts. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court has
118. Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 130-32.
120. But see Jones v. Massingale, 251 S.C. 456, 463 64, 163 S.E.2d 217, 220 (1968) (examining
a lower court's bifurcation of the issue dealing with the validity of a release); Mitchell v. Fed.
Intermediate Credit Bank of Columbia, 165 S.C. 457, 463, 164 S.E. 136, 137 (1932) (noting that a
bifurcation of the issue of a dispositive affirmative defense could produce "beneficial results").
121. See Mitchell, 165 S.C. at 462 63, 164 S.E. at 137 (upholding the trial court's decision to
order a separate trial for a legal claim); Greene v. Washington, 105 S.C. 137, 140, 89 S.E. 649, 650
(1916) ("The discretion should generally be in favor of trying those issues first which would most
probably end the case.").
122. 233 S.C. 557, 106 S.E.2d 276 (1958), overruled by Indus. Welding Supplies, Inc. v. Atlas
Vending Co., 276 S.C. 196, 201, 277 S.E.2d 885, 887 (1981).
123. Id. at 560, 106 S.E.2d at 277.
124. Id. at 561, 106 S.E.2d at 277.
125. 276 S.C. 196, 277 S.E.2d 885.
126. Id. at 201, 277 S.E.2d at 887.
127. Id.
128. See McLain v. Ingram, 314 S.C. 359, 360, 444 S.E.2d 512, 512 (1994) (noting the adoption
of the current rules in 1985).
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also cited this rule in finding that a trial judge erred by not directing a verdict on the
issue of liability and submitting "only the issue of damages to the jury."'29
Four years later in 1985, following the lead of the federal courts, South
Carolina adopted its new Rules of Civil Procedure 3 ° and explicitly granted trial
judges the discretion to bifurcate trials to further convenience, avoid prejudice, or
promote expedition and economy.' 3' The supreme court noted that "[t]he adoption
of the [South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure] in 1985 heralded a new era in
South Carolina's civil practice, modernizing and streamlining our system.','
13 2
IV. BIFURCATION AS APPLIED IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Current South Carolina Law and the "No Overlap" Requirement
Under the state's current Rules of Civil Procedure, the South Carolina courts
have explicitly held that a "motion seeking bifurcation of the issues of liability and
damages ... is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court."'33 Generally,
courts granting bifurcation have done so to promote convenience and efficiency or
to avoid prejudice.'34 Also, under the current rules, "there is no per se rule that the
same jury must decide both issues.' 35 However, if a court orders bifurcation, it
must ensure that a party will not lose its right to a fulljury trial on all legal issues'36
or that a party appropriately waives this right. 3 Finally, a party cannot immediately
appeal an order granting bifurcation. 3 ' However, once appealed, the appellate court
can review bifurcation decisions for abuse of discretion only. 3 9
While the trial court has broad discretion in ordering bifurcation, there is one
critical limitation. In South Carolina, bifurcation is appropriate under Rule 42(b)
only if the legal and factual issues of both liability and damages are completely
distinct and do not overlap. 4 ° This requirement is quite stringent: "Where evidence
129. See White v. Fowler, 276 S.C. 370, 373, 278 S.E.2d 777, 778 (1981).
130. See McLain, 314 S.C. at 360, 444 S.E.2d at 512 (noting that the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure were adopted in 1985).
131. S.C. R. Civ.P. 42(b).
132. McLain, 314 S.C. at 360, 444 S.E.2d at 512.
133. Senterv. Piggly Wiggly Carolina Co., 341 S.C. 74, 77, 533 S.E.2d 575, 577 (2000); see also
Durham v. Vinson, 360 S.C. 639, 644-45 n.2, 602 S.E.2d 760, 762 n.2 (2004) (holding that a motion
seeking bifurcation of punitive damages is also addressed to the discretion of the trial court).
134. See, e.g., Doe v. Orangeburg County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 335 S.C. 556, 559, 518 S.E.2d 259,
260-61(1999) (noting that bifurcation is appropriate to avoid potential prejudice); Creighton v. Coligny
Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 334 S.C. 96, 109, 512 S.E.2d 510, 517 (1998) (noting that the bifurcation decision
requires consideration of "convenience, expedition, and judicial economy"); 4 S.C. JUR. Action § 43
(1991) (noting that prejudice, convenience, expedition, and economy are important considerations for
the court in deciding whether to bifurcate a trial).
135. Fortune v. Gibson, 304 S.C. 279, 281, 403 S.E.2d 674, 675 (Ct. App. 1991).
136. Johnson v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 292 S.C. 51, 55, 354 S.E.2d 895, 897 (1987).
137. Id. at 55, 354 S.E.2d at 897 (noting that the defendant waives the right to a jury trial if the
complaint is equitable and the counterclaim is "legal and permissive").
138. Senter, 341 S.C. at 77 78, 533 S.E.2d at 577.
139. Id. at 77, 533 S.E.2d at 577.
140. See Creighton v. Coligny Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 334 S.C. 96, 108, 512 S.E.2d 510, 516 (1998)
(citing Fortune, 304 S.C. at 281-82,403 S.E.2d at 675); Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines, 341 S.C.
68, 73 n.8, 533 S.E.2d 331, 333 n.8 (2000).
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relevant to the issues of both liability and damages overlap, bifurcation is
inappropriate.''
Arguably, South Carolina's complete restriction on issue overlap does not arise
from the Constitution's Reexamination Clause 142 for at least two reasons. First, no
South Carolina court seems to have expressly held that the Reexamination Clause
bars bifurcation when there is any overlap of issues. In its decision in Fortune v.
Gibson,'43 the court relied on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Alabama v. Blue Bird
Body Co. '44 to explain South Carolina's absolute prohibition against evidentiary and
issue overlap: "[T]he distinct issues requirement is dictated for the very practical
reason that if separate juries are allowed to pass on issues involving overlapping
legal and factual questions[,] the verdicts rendered by each could be
inconsistent."' 145 While the Fifth Circuit in Blue Bird relied on the Seventh
Amendment to caution against issue overlap, 146 the same court later cited Blue Bird
to support the proposition that some overlap was acceptable. 4 Specifically, the
court found that the Reexamination Clause does not preclude bifurcation where
there is an overlap of evidence.
14
Second, the only textual change that the South Carolina Supreme Court made
when adopting the former Federal Rule 42(b) was to change the line "always
preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States"'149 by removing
reference to the Seventh Amendment.' If the Reexamination Clause of the
Seventh Amendment prohibited bifurcation where there was any issue overlap, the
South Carolina Supreme Court presumably would have retained the reference in
South Carolina Rule 42(b).
South Carolina's historic antagonism toward bifurcation151 seems to drive the
state's strict "no overlap" requirement. Several South Carolina cases examining this
requirement 152 use similar language to that used in the restrictive holding in
141. Creighton, 334 S.C. at 108, 512 S.E.2d at 516 (citing Fortune, 304 S.C. at 281, 403 S.E.2d
at 675).
142. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("[N]o fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of common law.").
143. 304 S.C. 279, 403 S.E.2d 674 (CE App. 1991).
144. 573 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1978).
145. Fortune, 304 S.C. at 281 82, 403 S.E.2d at 675 (quoting Blue Bird, 573 F.2d at 318)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Blue Bird, 573 F.2d at 318 ("[T]he issue to be tried must be so distinct and separable from
the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice .... [It] is the general right of a litigant
to have only one jury pass on a common issue of fact." (citation omitted)).
147. Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402,423 n.21 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Blue Bird, 573
F.2d at 318-19) (distinguishing overlapping factual issues from overlapping evidence).
148. Id.
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (1966) (amended 2007) (emphasis added).
150. S.C. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
151. See discussion supra Part llI.B.
152. See, e.g., Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines, 341 S.C. 68, 73 n.8, 533 S.E.2d 331, 333
n.8 (2000) (reinforcing the "'separate issue' mandate"); Creighton v. Coligny Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 334
S.C. 96, 108, 512 S.E.2d 510, 516 (1998) (citing Fortune v. Gibson, 304 S.C. 279, 281-82, 403 S.E.2d
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Industrial Welding Supplies, Inc. v. Atlas Vending Co. 53 a case decided before
South Carolina adopted Rule 42(b) in an effort to "moderniz[e] and streamlin[e]"
civil practice in the state.'54 Ironically, Industrial Welding was actually an effort to
relax what the supreme court considered to be an overly restrictive approach to
bifurcation. 155
A brief survey of several South Carolina cases illustrates the contours of
bifurcation in the state. In Creighton v. Coligny Plaza Limited Partnership,'56 the
state's court of appeals noted that a trialj udge was within his discretion to bifurcate
when he determined that the issues were distinct and bifurcation would expedite the
trial.'57 In this negligence action, the trial judge found that the need for extensive
medical testimony and numerous related discovery issues would be moot if thejury
found the defendant not liable.'58 He further determined that the plaintiff s evidence
regarding damages was not necessary to establish liability,' 59 so the issues were
distinct and would not overlap. According to the court, the trial judge properly
considered "convenience, expedition, andjudicial economy as required under Rule
42(b)" in ordering bifurcation. 6 °
In Durham v. Vinson, 6 ' the South Carolina Supreme Court ordered a new trial
on punitive damages because it held that the trial judge should not have admitted
evidence of misconduct toward a third party. 6 2 This case is instructive because the
court openly praised the use of bifurcation, noting that "[w]e encourage
judges.., to bifurcate trials in complex medical malpractice cases .... particularly
when bifurcation helps to clarify and simplify the issues."' 63 The opinion also noted
that South Carolina courts must continue to heed the "'separate issue' mandate,"
but the decision whether to bifurcate is within a judge's discretion when the issues
are distinct. 
6 4
Six years before Durham, in Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines,165 the
South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed a trial judge's bifurcation order, finding
that an insurance case was so complex it would inherently involve overlapping
issues. 16 6 While the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision by the
court of appeals on other grounds, 6 the court also seemed to agree that the
underlying bifurcation might have been inappropriate:
153. 276 S.C. 196, 201, 277 S.E.2d 885, 887 (1981) (allowing separate trials "where there are
distinct jury issues" and the issues are separate from each other); see also supra text accompanying
notes 125 27 (discussing the holding of Industrial Welding).
154. McLain v. Ingram, 314 S.C. 359, 360, 444 S.E.2d 512, 512 (1994).
155. See Indus. Welding, 276 S.C. at 201, 277 S.E.2d at 887.
156. 334 S.C. 96, 512 S.E.2d 510.




161. 360 S.C. 639, 602 S.E.2d 760 (2004).
162. Id. at 652, 602 S.E.2d at 767.
163. Id. at 644-45 n.2, 602 S.E.2d at 762 n.2.
164. Id.
165. 332 S.C. 182, 503 S.E.2d 497 (Ct. App. 1998), rev 'don other grounds, 341 S.C. 68, 73, 533
S.E.2d 331, 334 (2000).
166. Id. at 189, 503 S.E.2d at 501.
167. Flagstar, 341 S.C. at 73, 533 S.E.2d at 334 (reversing because a party cannot immediately
appeal a bifurcation order).
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Our ruling should not be interpreted by the trial bench as in any
way lessening the level of responsibility of the trial judge to
determine appropriate severability in deciding a Rule 42(b)
motion. In exercising their discretion, trialj udges should take care
to analyze whether or not the issues are overlapping or not
distinct, in determining whether or not the "separate issue"
mandate of Rule 42(b) is met.'68
In the recent case of Erickson v. Jones Street Publishers,69 the South Carolina
Supreme Court reinstated a jury verdict on liability when the trial judge treated the
liability verdict as a response to advisory interrogatories and then allowed a second
verdict addressing both liability and damages. 7 ' On appeal, the court agreed with
the appellant's arguments that after bifurcating the case, the judge was without
power "to subsequently reopen the liability issue or disturb the jury's verdict."''
The South Carolina caselaw on bifurcation is less than robust and that dearth
of caselaw is telling. While courts speak in sweeping terms about the broad
discretion of the trial court' 7 2 and the benefits of bifurcation, 173 the requirement of
no issue overlap seems to speak even louder. Given South Carolina's historical
opposition to bifurcation'7 4 and the constant reminders that even evidence should
not overlap, 7 ' the courts seem to be cautioningjudges to bifurcate only the clearest
of cases. Oddly, the clearer the evidentiary divide, the less complex a case is likely
to be. The level of complexity seems to be the underlying rationale for the
reversal'76 of the trial judge's bifurcation decision in Flagstar'77 Yet it was in a
complex medical malpractice case, Durham v. Vinson, that the state's highest court
most enthusiastically endorsed bifurcation.'78
B. South Carolina as Compared to Other States
Most state rules governing bifurcation have language similar or identical to
South Carolina Rule 42(b). 9 Accordingly, "[m]ost state rules and statutes grant
state trial judges similarly broad discretion to sever issues for trial."' 80 In
168. Id. at 73 n.8, 533 S.E.2d at 333 n.8.
169. 368 S.C. 444, 629 S.E.2d 653 (2006).
170. Id. at 480 81, 629 S.E.2d at 672 73.
171. Id. at 479, 629 S.E.2d at 672.
172. See, e.g., Creighton v. Coligny Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 334 S.C. 96, 108, 512 S.E.2d 510, 516 (Ct.
App. 1998) ("This court must review a trial judge's decision to bifurcate the issues of liability and
damages under an 'abuse of discretion' standard." (citations omitted)).
173. See, e.g., Durham v. Vinson, 360 S.C. 639, 645 n.2, 602 S.E.2d 760, 762 n.2 (2004)
("[B]ifurcation helps to clarify and simplify the issues.").
174. See discussion supra Part III.B.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 140 41.
176. Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines, 341 S.C. 68, 73, 533 S.E.2d 331,334 (2000).
177. See Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines, 332 S.C. 182, 189, 503 S.E.2d 497, 501 (Ct. App.
1998), rev'don other grounds, 341 S.C. 68, 533 S.E.2d 331 (2000).
178. Durham, 360 S.C. at 645 n.2, 602 S.E.2d at 762 n.2.
179. See, e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 42(b); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 42(b); COLO. R. Civ. P. 42(b); FLA. R. Civ.
P. 1.270b; IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(b); IOWA R. Civ P. 186; N.J. R. CT. 4:7-7.
180. Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 31 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
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Connecticut, for example, courts look to the overlap of issues as only one of many
factors in deciding whether to bifurcate a case. Among those factors are:
(1) whether the issues are significantly different from one another;
(2) whether the issues are to be tried before a jury or to the court;
(3) whether the posture of discovery on the issues favors a single
trial or bifurcation; (4) whether the documentary and testimonial
evidence on the issues overlap[;] and[] (5) whether the party
opposing bifurcation will be prejudiced if it is granted. 8'
In Terrain Enterprises, Inc. v. Mockbee,'82 the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that
the trial judge was within his discretion in bifurcating a trial where evidence
relating to damages was reviewed in the liability phase.'83 The court held that the
efficiency and clarity provided by bifurcation outweighed any harm done by the
overlap of issues in the two phases of trial.' 84
C. South Carolina as Compared to the Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the lower federal courts in South
Carolina seem to take a more liberal and permissive view of bifurcation than South
Carolina state courts do.' 85 However, other district courts in the Fourth Circuit
specifically caution against bifurcation, though these courts would allow some
overlap.'86 The relevant caselaw in the Fourth Circuit regarding bifurcation
indicates that when one issue might be highly prejudicial to the determination of
another, bifurcation is appropriate.' 87 In Dixon v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 88 the
court actually overruled a court's refusal to bifurcate, finding that the trial court
should have ordered bifurcation because evidence introduced regarding one claim
was highly prejudicial to a separate claim.'89 The court also ruled that the process
of resolving both state and federal claims in the same trial resulted in "considerable
juror confusion."' 9 °
181. PRI Capital Group, LLC v. E. Capital Funding, LLC, No. X04CV0101035125, 2004 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 3426, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2004) (citing Dallas v. Goldberg, 143 F. Supp.
2d 312, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). Other state courts have ruled, either implicitly or explicitly, that some
overlap between liability and damages is not determinative of the bifurcation decision. See, e.g., Ham
v. H.M.R. Joint Venture, No. DV 99-194, 2002 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 2536, at *6 (D. Mont. Mar. 22,
2002) (considering issue and factual overlap together); State v. Monschke, 135 P.3d 966, 977 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2006) (finding bifurcation inappropriate where there is a substantial overlap of issues).
182. 654 So. 2d 1122 (Miss. 1995).
183. Id. at 1132.
184. Id.
185. See infra notes 187 94 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 195 97 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 110 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[W]hen it is
determined that the evidence . . . will be prejudicial to the jury's consideration . . . .
bifurcation... remains an available solution.").
188. 990 F.2d 1440 (4th Cir. 1993).
189. Id. at 1443. The trial court had allowed evidence of loss of consortium on a state law claim
while the federal law claim did not allow recovery for loss of consortium. Id.
190. Id. at 1444.
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The Fourth Circuit also does not restrict bifurcation to claims that do not
overlap. In fact, district courts within the Fourth Circuit have held that while an
overlap of claims may "caution against bifurcation," an overlap between liability
and damages issues does not preclude "an otherwise justified bifurcation."' 91
Realizing "the benefits of 'bifurcated' trials,"'92 one South Carolina district court
recently ruled that a trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he refused to
bifurcate a trial, consequently allowing a jury to hear evidence of the defendant's
net worth in the liability phase. 193 The court found that the trialjudge sufficiently
instructed the jury not to use such evidence in determining liability.' 94
Other district courts in the Fourth Circuit have viewed bifurcation as the
exception. A district court in West Virginia refused to bifurcate and subject the
parties to "the needless expense of two trials in the same action."' 95 A district court
in North Carolina similarly held that "a single trial [would] be more expedient and
efficient."'9 6 The North Carolina court also noted that there are five factors
traditionally considered in deciding whether to bifurcate: separability of the issues,
simplification of discovery and the conservation of resources, prejudice to the
parties, the effect of bifurcation on the possibility of settlement, and the suitability
of bifurcating the trial but not discovery.'97
North Carolina's consideration of multiple factors 9 is consistent with other
courts adopting a stricter view of bifurcation where issue overlap is only one of
many factors.' 99 The federal view is consistent with Professor Gensler's argument:
Courts should not reject bifurcation when they detect any overlap.
Instead, courts must compare the likely overlap with the potential
savings. Naturally, parties who feel disadvantaged by bifurcation
have an incentive to exaggerate the expected overlap of evidence,
while parties who feel advantaged by bifurcation will have a
191. F & G Scrolling Mouse L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D 385, 388 (M.D.N.C. 1999).
192. Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 64 F.R.D. 415, 418 (D.S.C. 1974).
193. Pernanza Hill v. USA Truck, Inc., No. 8:06-CV-1010-GRA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39197,
at *30 (D.S.C. May 30, 2007).
194. Id.
195. Walhonde Tools, Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., No. 2:06-0537, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43776, at *19-20 (S.D. W. Va. June 15, 2007). However, the court stated that it would consider
granting bifurcation ifthe defendants could show a "substantial probability ofprevailing on the question
of liability." Id. at *20.
196. F & G Scrolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387 (citing Industrias Metalicas Marva, Inc. v.
Lausell, 172 F.R.D 1, 2 (D.P.R. 1997); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 35 (D. Del.
1995)).
197. Id. at 387 93.
198. See id.
199. Many federal courts outside the Fourth Circuit also treat issue overlap as one of several
issues to consider in making a determination regarding bifurcation. See, e.g., Griffin v. City of Opa-
Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1301 (1 th Cir. 2001) (finding "substantial overlap inthe issues, facts, evidence,
and witnesses"); Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting the concern
of the "potential overlap of issues"); McLaughlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 30 F.3d 861, 871
(7th Cir. 1994) (noting that issue overlap would not "significantly improve the management of the
trial"); WillemijnHoudstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429, 1434 (D. Del.
1989) ("[O]verlapping of issues is significant to the decision whether to bifurcate."); Brad Ragan, Inc.
v. Shrader's Inc., 89 F.R.D. 548, 548 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (finding that the existence of the same evidence
regarding liability and damages did not preclude bifurcation).
[Vol. 59: 433
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corresponding incentive to understate the expected overlap of
evidence. Therefore, judges must use their experience to assess
the likelihood of overlap independently.
20 0
Unlike the view endorsed by federal courts and Professor Gensler, the South
Carolina Supreme Court instructs trial judges to prohibit issue overlap,20' which
limits judges' discretion in deciding whether to bifurcate.
V. CONCLUSION
South Carolina would do well to eliminate its no overlap restriction and truly
give trial judges discretion to bifurcate their trials. As a litigation tool, the benefits
of bifurcation outweigh its burdens.
2
1




manyjurists and scholars support the practice. 2 4 By allowing the trial court to focus
on one important issue at a time, the practice promotes an efficient use ofjudicial
resources. 20 5 Additionally, the South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the
benefit bifurcation can bring to certain types of litigation.20 6
Further, bifurcation is not a tool that works unfairly in the defendant's favor.
Although most studies show a higher win ratio for the defendant in a bifurcated
trial, 20 7 two important considerations exist: the plaintiff often wins a higher
damages award in a bifurcated trial when it prevails;2 8 and in a unitary trial, the
jury tends to use damages evidence inappropriately in determining liability. 20 9 The
decrease in a plaintiff s chances of prevailing coupled with this increase in damages
awards in bifurcated trials seems to reflect thatj uries in bifurcated cases are making
decisions based on the evidence and not that juries are exhibiting any prejudice
toward the plaintiff. Any process that enables juries to use evidence more
appropriately to reach a legally accurate result furthers justice and prejudices no
one.
Unfortunately, South Carolina courts make inefficient use ofthis litigation tool.
Not until 1981, with the holding in Industrial Welding Supplies, Inc. v. Atlas
Vending Co., did the South Carolina Supreme Court truly enable trial judges to
grant bifurcation.210 However, the court still required the bifurcated issue to be
"separate from all other issues. ' '21' When South Carolina adopted Rule 42(b) just
a few years later in 1985, the court lauded the new efficiency the federal-based
200. Gensler, supra note 6, at 778 79 (internal citations omitted).
201. See Durham v. Vinson, 360 S.C. 639, 645 n.2, 602 S.E.2d 760, 762 n.2 (2004).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 37-52.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 53 60, 65 71.
204. See discussion supra Part II.A.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
206. See Durham, 360 S.C. at 645 n.2, 602 S.E.2d at 762 n.2.
207. See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 57, at 1612 tbl.3.
208. See Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 5, at 283.
209. See id. at 282.
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rules brought to South Carolina's civil litigation.2 12 However, the court retained its
no overlap requirement,21 3 and imposed it on cases in which evidence regarding
both damages and liability might overlap.214
While the no overlap restriction may prevent a bifurcated trial from violating
the Constitution's Reexamination Clause, the clause, at most, prohibits two separate
juries from ruling on the same legal issue.21 5 Even the Fifth Circuit, quoted by the
South Carolina Supreme Court in support of its no overlap restriction,216 now allows
for some overlap of liability and damages issues.217 The South Carolina no overlap
rule thus seems to reflect the state's antagonism to bifurcation2"' rather than an
attempt to comply with the Reexamination Clause.
At the federal level, issue overlap alone will not prohibit bifurcation;21 9
however, courts still rarely bifurcate cases.22 ° This is unfortunate, especially
considering the flexibility bifurcation can bring to the more routine civil actions.221
However, the support of bifurcation lent by scholars and jurists such as Professor
Gensler and Judge Tobin has provided bifurcation with a doctrinal boost.222 As this
work proliferates, perhaps more judges will feel comfortable expanding the use of
bifurcation beyond its "traditional parameters. 223
As it currently exists, South Carolina's no overlap rule creates at least three
areas of confusion, which in turn create significant obstacles to the use of
bifurcation. First, the restrictive nature of the rule is inconsistent with South
Carolina's support of the underlying theory of bifurcation.224 Courts in other
jurisdictions that openly discourage bifurcation, however, would seem to allow the
practice in cases where South Carolina's no overlap restriction would prohibit it.
225
Second, while the South Carolina Supreme Court has specifically endorsed
bifurcation in certain complex cases,226 logic seems to dictate that the more complex
the case, the greater the likelihood of evidentiary overlap. Further, although its
212. See McLain v. Ingram, 314 S.C. 359, 360, 444 S.E.2d 512, 512 (1994) ("The adoption of the
[South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure] in 1985 heralded a new era in South Carolina's civil practice,
modernizing and streamlining our system.").
213. See Durham v. Vinson, 360 S.C. 639, 645 n.2, 602 S.E.2d 760, 762 n.2 (2004).
214. Id. at 651, 602 S.E.2d at 767.
215. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
216. Fortune v. Gibson, 304 S.C. 279, 281-82, 403 S.E.2d 674, 675 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting
Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 1978)).
217. See Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 423 n.21 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Blue Bird,
573 F.2d at 318-19).
218. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 199.
220. See discussion supra Parts IIA, IV.C.
221. Tobin, supra note 38, at 16 (listing several advantages of bifurcation in routine negligence
actions).
222. Two of Gensler's articles about bifurcation Gensler, supra note 6, and Gensler, supra note
37 have been cited by courts and other journals more than fifty times since 2000. Westlaw Home
Page, http://www.westlaw.com (enter citing reference; follow "Keycite" hyperlinks) (last visited Feb.
15, 2008).
223. See Gensler, supra note 6, at 723.
224. See Durham v. Vinson, 360 S.C. 639, 645 n.2, 602 S.E.2d 760, 762 n.2 (2004).
225. See discussion supra Part IV.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol59/iss3/2
CIVIL PROCEDURE
decision was reversed on other grounds,22 the South Carolina Court of Appeals has
held that bifurcation might be particularly inappropriate in a complex case.228 Thus,
the no overlap rule has prohibited bifurcation in cases where the courts have
actually encouraged its use. Finally, while the South Carolina appellate courts note
the broad discretion of trial judges to order bifurcation,229 consistent reminders to
heed the no overlap requirement,23 ° coupled with the courts' historic disapproval
of the practice, 231 discourages trial judges from exercising that discretion in all but
the most obvious cases. This result is detrimental because any increase in the use
of bifurcation is arguably the direct result of the ability of judges who support the
practice to freely employ the procedure.232 Thus, South Carolina's no overlap
requirement creates a formidable concrete hurdle that must be overcome by any
judges wishing to bifurcate any of their cases.
South Carolina would eliminate this confusion and resulting obstacles if it
abandoned the no overlap restriction. Bifurcation would be encouraged in both
theory and practice; the inherent evidentiary overlap in complex cases would be one
of only several factors for trial courts to consider; and trial judges would have the
discretion in their bifurcation decisions. Furthermore, as caseloads continue to grow
and bifurcation continues to prove itself a potent and efficient tool in civil litigation,
removing the rigid no overlap requirement would allow trial judges in South
Carolina the flexibility to make meaningful use of the procedure.
This first step is critical, but it should only be the beginning. Bifurcation, like
any procedural tool, is only effective when used properly. The full benefits of
bifurcation will likely be realized only when judges are willing to employ the
practice in many types of cases. 233 As Judge Tobin observed, "bifurcation must be
used on a larger number of cases in order to make it work.
234
Before South Carolina can begin to realize the real benefits of bifurcation, it
must first eliminate the restrictions on the use of the procedure in all but a few
cases. The South Carolina Supreme Court should abandon the no overlap
requirement, which would truly allow bifurcation under Rule 42(b) to usher in "a
new era in South Carolina's civil practice. 235
Derek A. Shoemake
227. Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines, 341 S.C. 68, 73, 533 S.E.2d 331, 334 (2000).
228. Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines, 332 S.C. 182, 189, 503 S.E.2d 497, 501 (Ct. App.
1998) ("Given the complexities of the insurance coverage issues in this case, we hold the trial court
erred in granting the motion for separate trials."), rev 'don other grounds, 341 S.C. 68, 533 S.E.2d 331
(2000).
229. See Durham, 360 S.C. at 644-45 n.2, 602 S.E.2d at 763 n.2.
230. See id.
231. See discussion supra Part III.B.
232. See discussion supra Part IV.B C.
233. See Tobin, supra note 38, at 20.
234. Id.
235. McLain v. Ingram, 314 S.C. 359, 360, 444 S.E.2d 512, 512 (1994).
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